EU and Maghreb: Asylums, Immigration And Externalization
In his article, Moroccan Abdelkrim Belguendouz voices stern criticism of the immigration policy the EU has practiced in recent years. His argument is that the EU is seeking to externalise and outsource its immigration processes to the neighbouring countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has long been censured, and it has proven especially problematic for North African transit countries. It is these so-called Maghreb states – through which sub-Saharan people pass on their way to Europe – that Belguendouz focuses on. In his opinion, intensifying border control is not a sufficient remedy; the structural causes of immigration must also be addressed.
Finland's second presidency of the European Union in the last half of 2006 offers an opportunity to examine the development and results of European immigration and asylum policy after the European Council meeting in Tampere 15–16 October 1999, as well as the analysis of the impacts of the policy in partnership countries, notably those in northern Africa.
The Tampere European Council is significant, for the vision presented there was conceived of as global, coherent, balanced and integrated. The Tampere guidelines can be divided into three general categories: (1) policies aiming to control the flow of immigrants, (2) policies facilitating the integration of immigrants in the receiving society, and (3) increasing cooperation with the immigrants' countries of origin, with special attention devoted to the economic and social factors underlying illegal immigration.
In reality, little besides paying lip service has been done to tackle the structural problems in the immigrants' countries of origin that necessitate a medium- or long-term approach. Nor has a consistent, concrete, community-wide integration policy taken form. By contrast, new practices have been implemented in the first category, reinforcing restrictive and security-oriented immigration policies. In practice this has meant an intensifying policy of externalization.
The idea behind the externalization policy is to protect Europe from an invasion of immigrants. Those dreaming of an El Dorado are gathered in camps outside Europe and their asylum applications are denied. The most "suitable", "disposable" and economically useful few are allowed to enter, while the repressive expulsion of the majority is "outsourced" to non-European governments operating outside the realm of democratic control. The establishment of regional safety zones and "detention centres" outside the EU was first introduced into the Union's agenda in the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003, following a proposition made by Tony Blair earlier the same year. France and Sweden were opposed to the idea, but it resurfaced a year later by an Italo-German initiative suggesting the setting up of "gateways" and reception centres. These are mere euphemisms for places that would essentially be used to detain and separate people, and to prevent the majority from entering Europe. Although an active civil society in Spain and France, as well as in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco (Libya's stance is ambiguous) has managed to block such positions from being accepted, this has not prevented the Council from granting funds to the establishment of pilot centres in the Maghreb countries. The Council has also demanded that the Commission conduct a feasibility study on the processing of asylum applications outside the EU. The motives behind such decisions are hardly unclear: it is less about protecting asylum seekers than about improving the capacity of northern African countries to process claims for asylum and, ultimately, to bar unwanted persons from entering Europe. In other words, in spite of protecting refugees, Europe protects itself from refugees. The aim of the process is to sacralize the EU's territory and external borders, and to reinforce the idea of an endangered Europe.
Amidst such a mental climate, the EU and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) signed a financing agreement on 14 December 2004. Worth close to one million euros, the agreement aimed to strengthen northern Africa's institutional capacities in asylum matters. This funding enabled the launching of the ASILMAROC training programme, coordinated by the Paris-based ecumenical organisation CIMADE and AFVIC, a Moroccan association, as well as of two related studies conducted by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) operating in Copenhagen.
A report by the Andalusian human rights organisation Associacion Prederechos Humanos (APHDA) shows that what happened in Ceuta and Melilla was an inevitable corollary of the Spanish government's policy towards (mainly Moroccan and sub-Saharan) immigrants at the EU's southern border. It is a policy inclined towards police control and closed borders; a policy that does not hesitate to violate fundamental human rights, including the right to life itself.
The situation in Morocco is also, generally speaking, a consequence of the political environment that has been created and the measures that have been adopted. For some years now, the question of sub-Saharan immigration has been predominantly dealt with as a security issue. With this in mind, it is useful to recall the cooperation offer made by Driss Basri, Morocco's former omnipotent interior minister, to the EU in 1999. Said Mr Basri: "The goal of Morocco is to be an active party in the European immigration policy that follows from the Schengen Agreement. Morocco is conscious of the values and interests it shares with the EU. Because of our geographic location and our economic, cultural and social ties, were are an integral partner in European security questions in the Mediterranean region ... European defence cannot be effective without Morocco's contribution."
Subsequently, The EU's High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG) set out to draft an Action Plan for Morocco in 1999, coordinated by Spain. The Action Plan was approved at the European Council meeting in Tampere. One of the plan's security recommendations concerning sub-Saharan states was that Morocco should demand the citizens of Senegal, Mali, the Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea (Conakry) and Niger permanently residing in Morocco to renew their visas. In addition to being a flagrant violation of Morocco's sovereignty and a direct intervention in its domestic politics, such a requirement undervalued the country's status as an African nation and its need to stress its role and presence in the region.
With the ensuing establishment of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for Morocco by the European Commission in 2001, some 115 million euros were directed to projects relating to immigration, comprising 40 million euros earmarked for "border control". Consistent with the philosophy underlying the latter project, an extremely heavy and restrictive juridical arsenal was created, including a new law (N° 02-03) concerning foreigners' entry into and staying in Morocco, as well as illegal immigration and emigration. The fact that a law on counter-terrorism (N° 03-03), spurred by the terrorist strikes in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, was approved at the same time, in June 2003, was hardly a coincidence.
Tunisia too has assumed a harsher stance. This is most notably reflected in its legislation: An extremely strict law, complementing the law no. 75-40 on passports and travel documents adopted on 14 May 1995, was passed on 3 December 2004. It deems criminal not only being caught red-handed, but also the attempt and preparation of or assisting in illegal migration – that is to say, acts that have not developed from intention to action. Moreover, the law obliges people to report illegal immigrants to the authorities, incites xenophobia, and encourages to comply with the many forms and agents of control that have created these novel policies.
The Moroccan institutional immigration policy framework has also been strengthened with the creation of two new structures within the ministry of the interior, namely an agency for migration and border control and a migration monitoring centre. Among the former's first achievements were the five "repatriation operations" of Nigerians carried out in late 2003 and early 2004. In total, almost 2,000 people were repatriated. The figure does not include those sub-Saharans that were arrested at the Algerian-Moroccan border as part of these operations.
The agency's strategy is regarded as multiform. But although the ministry of the interior has been keen to stress the comprehensive nature of its approach, it is worth noting that all aspects of the strategy – legislation, institutions, security and international cooperation – are based upon the logic of securitization. In other words, enhancing security is what drives the tightening of juridical, diplomatic and administrative practices.
At the other end of the Maghreb region, Libya has completely abided by the wishes of the EU (Italy in particular) in security matters. The question of migration has become a means of engaging in "horse-trading" and self-interest driven politics aiming to rid Libya of its marginalized international position – at the expense of sub-Saharan migrants. A statement given by the Libyan foreign minister in the summer of 2004 concerning the "invasion" of sub-Saharans illustrates the prevailing attitude: "They are over a million. If they stay for another ten or fifteen years, Libya will not be the same, they impose their rules on some areas ... We do not know whether they come here to live and work or whether they are terrorists." As far as the solutions to this problem are concerned, the minister announced: "Alone, we will not be able to handle this" (La Stampa, 9 August 2004).
Whereas "charters of humiliation" depart from Morocco and Libya, Algeria, which is an important transit country but not a direct source of entry to Europe, also sends away "trucks of shame" that transport sub-Saharans to its borders, especially those with Niger and Mali.
Generally speaking, all the Maghreb states (including Mauritania) have seen a great number of their citizens emigrate abroad. However, while presenting themselves as defenders of these migrants' rights, they refuse to grant similar rights to foreigners within their own territory.
In an effort to make its engagements more visible and concrete, the European Council in its meeting in Brussels 16–17 December 2005 adopted a kind of a road map concerning migration and priority actions in Africa and the Mediterranean region. With regard to enhancing dialogue and cooperation with Africa spring 2006 onwards, the Council's objectives included improving relations with key sub-Saharan African states on the basis of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement that calls for readmission and effective implementation of obligations in the field.
As part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU-Morocco Action Plan, based on the unrelenting logic of securitization, was adopted in Brussels on 17 December 2004. Item 48 thereof, on preventing and combating illegal immigration to and via Morocco, highlights the necessity of "EU action upstream with regard to countries of transit and origin and implementation of the ACP agreements, in particular regarding readmission."
This is one of the main objectives the EU has assigned for the Euro-African ministerial conference on migration that is to be held in Rabat on 10 and 11 July 2006. Among the goals listed in a non-paper produced by Spain are the necessity of "reaching an agreement on readmission between the countries of origin, transit and destination", focussing on strengthening border control in countries of origin and transit, increasing police and judicial cooperation to track down and prosecute networks of illegal trafficking, and signing readmission agreements that allow the repatriation of permanent alien residents or third-country nationals in such a manner that honours their dignity and human rights. Another ministerial conference between the European and African Unions on migration is scheduled to be held in Libya's Tripoli 5 and 6 June 2006. This meeting will address disputes between the Maghreb countries, mainly stemming from the question of the Moroccan West Sahara.
Besides organizing the EUROMED ministerial conference on migration, the European Council's Neighbourhood Policy stresses the importance of realizing these priority actions with the following Maghreb countries :
► adopting as soon as possible (during 2006) the EU-Libya Action Plan on migration that will reinforce the externalisation of Europe's migration policy towards Libya; ► beginning negotiations with Algeria aiming to a swift conclusion of the EU-Algeria readmission agreement; ► closing the negotiations on the EU-Morocco readmission agreement as quickly as possible.
It is worth noting here that Morocco has been heavily pressured to sign the agreement since 2000. This was particularly bluntly expressed at the Sevilla European Council in June 2002, headed by the then prime minister of Spain José Maria Aznar who did everything in his power to punish those third countries that refused to cooperate in the fight against illegal migration.
Although opposition from Sweden and Denmark managed to restrain Spain's zeal, EU member states have since adopted conditionality in migration as their collective goal. Thereby the 25 member states approved the Hague Programme in the EU Summit held in Brussels 4–5 November 2004. Using the stick as well as the carrot, the EU strives to accomplish "complete integration in the field of migration in its existing and future relations with third countries" and to "strengthen its southern border". The Union has also expressed its generosity towards countries that "demonstrate a genuine commitment" to fulfil the obligations conferred on them.
This migration conditionality was formulated unequivocally by the European ministers of justice and home affairs in their meeting in January 2005, two months after the summit. It was agreed therein that intensifying cooperation with transit countries in asylum question should be taken into consideration within the new neighbourhood policy.
The influence of Franco Frattini, the European Commission's Vice-President and the Commissioner responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security, in these developments should not be underestimated. The Italian Frattini has regularly fixed "imperative" time limits for the signing of the agreement. For example, in the end of January 2006, during the Austrian presidency, he set June 2006 as the deadline, explaining that Morocco had well understood the necessity of advancing slightly faster with this question. During his March 2005 visits to several European countries affected by illegal immigration Mr. Frattini demanded that the agreement be signed in December 2005, asserting that "the EU observes that the readmission agreement has already been the topic of eight negotiation rounds. The EU invites Morocco to double its efforts so that the agreement could be concluded by the end of the year." The agreement should be applicable to not only Moroccans, but also sub-Saharans and other foreigners that pass through Morocco.
The agreement has become something of an obsession to European decision-makers, eager to seize any opportunity to harry the other party, who seem to bring it up in all their encounters with Moroccans – regardless of the nature of the event. A good example of this was a meeting held in Brussels in November 2005 relating to the EU-Morocco Association Agreement of 26 February 1996: disregarding the preset agenda dealing with economic and financial matters, Europeans quickly deviated from the original framework to focus on one sole issue – the necessity of Morocco signing the agreement promptly so that the EU could send illegal sub-Saharan immigrants that had travelled through Morocco back to where they had come from...
Translated by Henri Purje
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